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Abstract 
The efficacy of the 2001 and 2003 Bush tax cuts was a major topic of discussion in the 
2010 midterm elections. I investigate the effect of the possible expiration and eventual extension 
of the dividend tax cut on US stock market performance in 2010 based on the methodology used 
by Amronin, Harrison and Sharpe (2008). I compare aggregate performance of US common 
stocks relative to foreign stocks using equity indices, and examine cross-sectional performance 
amongst US stocks by creating different stock portfolios based on their dividend yield. This 
comparison is done over two event windows, (1) 20-24 September 2010 and (2) 3-8 December 
2010. Consistent with previous studies, I find that the US stock market did respond to negative 
and positive news on the extension of the Bush-era dividend tax cuts, with stock prices falling 
and rising, respectively. My findings also suggest that this aggregate effect was probably muted 
by the redistribution of funds by investors from lower-yield to higher-yield stocks. Unlike in 
2003, however, in the post-financial crisis context of 2010, the redistribution seemed to 
particularly favor stocks with medium-dividend yield, rather than smaller, higher-risk stocks 
with the highest dividend yield.  
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Introduction 
In 2010, the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA, 
often referred to as the 2001 Bush Tax Cuts) and Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act 
of 2003 (JGTRRA, also known as the 2003 Bush Tax Cuts) came up for debate in Congress. 
Amongst the tax rates that were set to increase were taxes on individual dividend tax income, 
which had been lowered in the 2003 JGTRRA. If the tax cuts expired, dividend taxes would rise 
from 15% to the 1990s rate of up to 39.6%. The dividend tax cuts had initially been set to expire 
on 31 December 2008, but were extended by the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act 
of 2005 (TIPRA), which pushed their expiration date to 31 December 2010. 
The main issue of contention in 2010 was the extension of the tax cuts for taxpayers of all 
income levels; Democrats wanted the tax cuts to expire for higher-income earners
1
, while 
Republicans were in support of making the tax cuts permanent for all. In addition, Congressmen 
on both sides of the aisle argued that the tax cuts should not be allowed to expire in 2010 because 
of the state of the economy; they argued that extending the dividend tax cut would keep the cost 
of equity capital low, stimulate investment by firms and thus lead to economic growth and job 
creation. The 111
th
 Congress eventually passed the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance 
Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010
2
, which extended the Bush Tax Cuts, including 
the dividend tax cuts, for all income levels until 2012. In addition, the bill extended jobless 
benefits and business tax relief measures
3
 and reduced payroll taxes by 2% in calendar year 
2011. It also alters the Internal Revenue Service code to exempt estates worth less than $5 
                                               
1 i.e. Individuals who earned more than $200,000 and couples with a combined income of more than $250,000 
2The bill, H.R. 4856 was signed into Public Law  111-312 by President Obama on 17 December 2010 
3 E.g. Allowing for accelerated depreciation of capital expenditure 
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million
4
 from being subject to an estate tax, and sets the maximum estate tax at 35% 
(Congressional Research Service, 2010).  
The effect of these tax cuts is a major issue of debate, particularly given the ballooning 
federal deficit, and the direct impact tax cuts have on worsening that deficit. However, although 
a great deal of literature exists that evaluates the effect of the implementation of the 2003 tax 
cuts on US stock market performance, there is no broad consensus on whether they were good or 
bad for US stocks. While this lack of consensus is not surprising for such a highly politicized 
topic, the importance of the topic should motivate further research in order to gain an accurate 
understanding of the situation. The events of 2010, which saw the tax cuts under threat of expiry 
and eventually extended, provide an opportunity to do just that. Specifically, this paper uses the 
methodology set out in Amronin, Harrison and Sharpe (2008) to test the hypothesis that the 
threat of the 2003 dividend tax expiring cuts lowered US stock prices, while their extension 
boosted US stock prices. This reaction would reflect whether the market believed the tax cuts 
were good for the economy. 
Literature Review 
The effect of individual-level dividend taxes on stock prices has been the topic of much 
economic research, with the literature examining both aggregate-level and cross-sectional 
effects.  
On an aggregate level, Poterba (2004) hypothesized that the dividend tax cut would 
reduce the tax burden on projected dividend payouts, increasing firm value and thus stock prices. 
He capitalizes annual foregone tax revenue as a crude measure of the gain in US equities, and 
estimates a 6% gain in US equities in the first 2 quarters of 2003. Auerbach and Hassett (2005) 
                                               
4 $10 million per couple 
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also find that a reduction in dividend taxes increases firm valuation, particularly for high-
dividend yield firms. 
Similarly, Dhaliwal, Krull and Li (2005) studied three ex-ante measures of the implied 
cost of capital over a three-year period
5
, using methods developed by Gebhardt, Lee and 
Swaminathan (2001), Claus and Thomas (2001) and Gode and Mohanram (2003). All three of 
these models are a variation of the Feltham-Ohlson residual income model and use stock prices 
to calculate the implied cost of equity capital, but they each specify different assumptions about 
the factors that determine the growth rate of earnings in perpetuity. They find that in their sample 
group, the mean implied cost of equity capital fell by 1.47% from the effective date of the 2003 
tax act, suggesting that the dividend tax cuts achieved their intended effect of lowering the cost 
of equity capital, and that dividend taxation affects firm valuation. A major weakness of their 
study, however, is that they do not really control for non-tax related events during their three-
year study period. Furthermore, as Amronin et al (2008) note, a key assumption in Dhaliwal et 
al’s methodology is a stable equity risk premium throughout their period of study. During the 
three-year period that Dhaliwal et al study, however, the equity risk premium would have been 
influenced heavily by (1) a string of accounting scandals and the regulatory response these 
scandals generated, and (2) developments leading up to the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003. 
These non-tax events would have provided external shocks to the stock market. 
To control for non-tax factors influencing the performance of the stock market, some 
economists have thus favored the event study approach, where stock market data from a narrow 
time period surrounding a key development is examined. Due to this short time horizon, event 
studies allow one to examine the effects of specific events in relative isolation. Event studies on 
financial events and literature on the methodology of event studies have been around since the 
                                               
5 For six quarters before and after the passage of the 2003 Tax Act, i.e. 1 October 2001 to 30 September 2004 
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1980s (e.g. Brown and Warner, 1980 & 1985), and there is agreement within the field that event 
studies can provide reliable information when conducted correctly. Specifically, event study tests 
must correctly specify both (1) that the abnormal returns during the chosen event window are 
significantly different from zero, and (2) that the model used to find those cumulative abnormal 
returns is accurate (Kothari and Warner, 2004). 
One such event study is Amronin et al’s (2008) research into the aggregate and cross-
sectional effects of the dividend tax cut in 2003. They study two event windows when there was 
significant positive or negative information about the dividend tax cut. Their two event windows 
are (1) 3-9 January 2003 and (2) 14-28 May 2003. Window (1) captured the market reaction to 
the Washington Post announcement of the some details of President Bush’s dividend tax cut 
plan, as well as Bush’s speech on the plan at the Economics Club of Chicago. Window (2) 
tracked the passage and reconciliation of the tax cut bill through the chambers of Congress 
through its signing into law. Their choice of event windows coincides with those chosen by 
Auerbach and Hassett (2005), who study the effect of the dividend tax cuts on the value of the 
firm.  Amronin et al find ―little if any imprint of the dividend tax cut news on the value of the 
aggregate stock market,‖ although, based on their findings, they attribute this more to portfolio 
reallocation from low-dividend to high-dividend stocks. From these results, they infer that the 
cost of equity capital does not fall, a leap in logic that is not well-supported throughout the rest 
of their paper. Nonetheless, their overall methodology seems sound, and I use a similar 
methodology to study the effects of the 2010 tax-related events on the stock market. 
The effect of tax cuts on stock prices at the aggregate level also depends on whether the 
cuts were expected or unexpected, temporary or permanent. Gourio and Miao (2010) classify the 
2003 JGTRRA as unexpected and temporary, given that there were sunset provisions built into 
5 
 
the bill and that the details of the bill that was ultimately passed were relatively uncertain until 
before May 2003. This view that the JGTRRA cuts were unexpected is further supported by 
other economists, including Auerbach and Hassett (2005) and Chetty, Rosenberg and Saez 
(2005). Gourio and Miao find that when tax cuts are permanent, ―aggregate capital, investment, 
consumption, output, labor, and total factor productivity all increase in the steady state, [as do] 
aggregate dividend payments and equity issuance.‖ When tax cuts are unexpected and 
temporary, however, ―the steady state does not change,‖ and ―aggregate investment decreases 
and aggregate dividend payments increase during the periods when the tax cuts are 
implemented.‖ 
At a cross-sectional level, studies on the 1993 and 2003 changes in dividend taxes in the 
US suggest that changes in rates of dividend taxation do affect share prices, and that the 
magnitude of change on share prices is influenced by dividend payout policy. Ayers, Cloyd and 
Robinson (2002), Amronin et al (2008) and Auerbach and Hassett (2005) all find that the share 
prices of high-dividend stocks increase (decrease) more than lower-dividend paying stocks when 
dividend taxes fall (rise). 
Two other factors that affect cross-sectional performance are (1) the tax status of the 
marginal investor, (2) the relative rates of capital gains and dividend taxes. With regards to the 
former, logic suggests that firms with higher proportions of institutional holdings would be less 
affected by changes in the individual dividend tax rate, and thus face smaller price fluctuations 
when personal dividend tax rates change. Ayers et al (2002) demonstrate that this intuition is 
consistent with empirical evidence from the 1993 rise in dividend taxes. 
Secondly, the relative capital gains and dividend tax rates also affect the impact on stock 
market prices, with relatively higher dividend tax rates discouraging dividend payouts (e.g. 
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Gourio and Miao, 2010; Chetty and Saez, 2005). In the US, capital gains are tax-advantaged 
because they are taxed only upon realization. In addition, from 1990 until 2003, capital gains 
faced a significantly lower tax rate than dividends
6
. For instance, Chetty and Saez (2005) find 
that the elimination of most of the tax benefits of capital gains relative to dividend payouts from 
the 2003 JGTRRA significantly increased dividend payments. The 2003 JGTRRA equalized 
capital gains and dividend tax rates for the first time since 1990 (Dhiwali et al, 2006). 
Finally, one interesting finding in cross-sectional studies is that the 2003 dividend tax 
cuts seemed to benefit zero-dividend firms the most. Amronin et al (2008) find that the non-
dividend paying firms gain larger cumulative abnormal returns than dividend-paying firms when 
the market learnt about the proposed dividend tax cuts, and Auerbach and Hassett (2005) find 
that the increase in firm value is largest for zero-dividend firms. Similarly, Dhaliwal, Krull and 
Li (2005) and Guenther, Jung and Williams (2005), who studied the effect of the tax cuts on the 
cost of equity capital, both find that after the 2003 tax cuts, the decrease in the cost of equity is 
larger for non-dividend paying firms than for dividend-paying firms. Amronin et al (2008) 
attribute this observation to a global spike in zero-dividend stock prices that is not related to tax 
effects. 
Methodology 
 I develop my event study methodology based on that used by Amronin, Harrison and 
Sharpe (2008) to study the impact of the dividend tax cuts in 2003. Their fundamental strategy is 
to compare the change in value of a portfolio of US equities vis-à-vis that of a benchmark 
portfolio that would not have been similarly affected by US dividend tax policy. For instance, to 
                                               
6 In 2003, long term capital gains taxes were reduced from a maximum of 20% to 15%; corresponding dividend 
taxes fell from 39.6% to 15% 
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calculate cumulative abnormal returns at an aggregate level, they compare the performance of 
the S&P 500 with that of the S&P Euro 350 and the Morgan Stanley Capital International index 
for Europe, Australasia and the Far East (MSCI EAFE). 
One weakness in their methodology, however, is that instead of using the levels of the 
foreign indices, they used i-Share Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs)
7
as substitutes. While this 
might minimize problems with nonsynchronity, the fact that these ETFs are traded in US markets 
increases the likelihood that they are owned and traded by US taxpayers. The ETFs are thus 
more likely to be affected by the US dividend tax cuts than the foreign indices they are based on. 
I alter their methodology in this aspect by using the values of the actual foreign indices, rather 
than their i-Share ETFs. 
Choice of Event Windows 
Event studies select event windows around significant information releases or 
developments in a situation. The complex political process surrounding the extension of the Bush 
tax cuts in 2010, however, is prone to information leakage and uncertainty about the ultimate 
passage of the bill. As such, I imitated the methodology put forth in Ayers et al (2002) and 
Amronin et al (2008) by choosing a short event window surrounding unexpected developments. I 
gauged the unexpectedness of a development by conducting a qualitative survey of newspaper 
articles in the Wall Street Journal, Washington Post and the New York Times. To get a 
quantitative measure of how much the tax cuts were on the public’s mind, I also tracked the 
volume of articles in those three newspapers that mentioned the extension of the Bush tax cuts 
(see Figure 1). In addition, I also took note of the placement of the articles. Based on this 
                                               
7 MSCI EAFE: EFA; S&P Euro 350: IEV 
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quantitative and qualitative examination, I selected the following event windows: (1) 20-24 
September 2010 and (2) 3-8 December 2010.  
Table 1: Key Events 
Date Event 
18 Sep 2010, Sat The Wall Street Journal reports in a front-page article that Nancy 
Pelosi is facing dissent from within her party about the tax cuts. 
20 Sep 2010, Mon The Washington Post reports that Democrats are ―close to vote on 
tax cuts.‖ 
22 Sep 2010, Wed The New York Times reports that the vote on the tax cuts might 
be pushed to after the elections; Democratic congressional leaders 
plan to meet for lunch on Thursday, 23 September 2010, to 
discuss the cuts 
23 Sep 2010, Thu Democrats decide to push vote on tax cuts till after the elections. 
6 Dec 2010, Mon— 
Morning 
Newspapers report that the White House and Republicans are 
close to reaching an agreement on the tax cuts 
6 Dec 2010, Mon— 
Evening  
President Obama reaches a compromise with Republican leaders 
on the tax cuts. 
7 Dec 2010, Tue Significant news coverage, including front page reporting, on the 
compromise reached. Business analysts explicitly attribute the rise 
in the stock market to this event. 
 
Figure 1: Volume of Newspaper Articles on the Bush Tax Cuts in 2010 
 
*From the Wall Street Journal, Washington Post and New York Times 
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The first event window represents a period where negative information was released 
regarding the extension of the tax cuts; the uncertainty was prolonged, and the possibility of the 
tax cuts expiring before a compromise was reached increased, since the negotiation window 
shrunk to the post-election months. The second event window represents a release of positive 
information since the bipartisan compromise increased the likelihood that the tax cuts would be 
extended. 
When dividend tax rates are expected to rise, investors are willing to pay less for 
dividend-paying stocks than before because they expect lower post-tax dividend payouts under 
the higher taxes, thus causing the share prices of dividend-paying firms to fall. I expect that the 
price decrease will be larger for firms with higher dividend yields because the decrease in the 
value of post-tax dividends is largest for them. 
To ensure that my event windows are not clouded by information other than news about 
the dividend tax cut, I also looked at the other major news topics during the event windows to 
see if they might have had an impact on stock performance. During the September event 
window, the other major news topics were the rallying of the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
(DJIA) and the 2010 midterm elections, with the Republicans releasing their ―Pledge to 
America‖ on 23rd September 2010. With regards to the news about the DJIA, given that the DJIA 
and S&P 500 generally move in sync
8
, the gain in the DJIA could have mitigated the negative 
effect I expect to see during the September window. Although the focus on the midterm elections 
in the months leading up to November probably did cloud stock market performance, this 
influence is inevitable for any event window around that time period. Nonetheless, the decision 
by Democratic congressional leaders to delay the vote on the tax cuts until after the midterm 
                                               
8 See Appendix A for a 6-month snapshot of the performance of the DJIA relative to the S&P 500 
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elections still garnered front-page coverage in the Wall Street Journal, and main-section 
coverage by the Washington Post and New York Times. 
During the December event window, other than the tax cuts, the lackluster performance 
of the Treasuries market received significant news coverage. Business analysts, however, 
concluded the ―plunge‖ in U.S. Treasury prices was partly ―in response to President Barack 
Obama's proposal to extend tax cuts that could support economic growth in the short term but 
raise national debt levels longer term‖ (Magrowski, 2010) and partly due to investors being 
willing to invest in riskier assets. In addition, the business press also explicitly attributed the rise 
in the S&P 500 and the NASDAQ Composite Index to the tax compromise brokered between the 
White House and Republicans
9
, and the tax compromise received front-page coverage in the 
Wall Street Journal and the New York Times. This qualitative survey thus seems to indicate that 
the tax cuts were the primary news topic that would have affected the stock market during the 
event windows. 
I thus expect that during the first event window (20-24 September 2010), stock prices, 
particularly those of the highest-dividend paying stocks, would have fallen. Conversely, I expect 
stock prices to rise in the latter event window (3-8 December 2010), and predict that this effect 
will be most pronounced amongst the stocks with the highest dividend yield. 
Data & Findings 
Aggregate Effects: US vs. Foreign Equity Indices 
The foreign equity indices serve as benchmark portfolios to gauge market performance 
that is less affected by news about the Bush tax cuts. US investors, the individuals potentially 
                                               
9 E.g. Bloomberg Businessweek reported on 7 December 2010, ―Stocks pop after Obama, GOP agree on taxes‖ 
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affected if the tax cuts were not extended, hold a relatively small proportion of foreign stocks
10
. 
By comparing US equity indices to foreign equity indices, I would then be able to observe if 
there was an overall abnormal market reaction in the US during the event windows. 
I obtained data on stock market index performance for both large- and small- cap indices 
from Yahoo Finance, MSCI and Bloomberg. Firms are considered to have large capitalizations 
(―large cap‖) if their market capitalization (i.e. total market value of their equity) exceeds US$10 
billion. Examples of large cap firms include Microsoft, Exxon Mobil and Apple. I used the S&P 
500 as the large cap equity index for the US, and compared its performance to that of the S&P 
Euro 350 and the MSCI EAFE
11
. The S&P Euro 350 reflects equity market performance of 
seventeen major European markets, and covers 70% of Europe’s market capitalization. The 
MSCI EAFE captures equity performance in developed markets outside North America. It 
consists of stocks from twenty two different countries in Europe, Australasia and the Far East.  
Firms are considered to have small capitalizations (―small cap‖) if their market 
capitalization is less than US$10 billion. For the baseline US performance, I used the Russell 
2000 Index, which measures small-cap US equity. It is comprised of approximately 2,000 of the 
smallest securities, as determined by their market cap and current index membership. The 
Russell 2000 was compared to the Financial Times and London Stock Exchange (FTSE) Small 
Cap Index, which covers over 4,600 small cap stocks drawn from forty eight countries, and the 
MSCI World ex. USA SC Index, which captures small cap firm’s equity performance from 
developed countries excluding the US. 
These data sources have been previously used by Amronin et al (2008) in their study of 
the effects of the dividend tax cuts in 2003, both when plans of the dividend tax cuts were first 
                                               
10 Estimated at about 10-15% of European equity markets (Amronin et al, 2008) 
11 Morgan Stanley Capital International index for Europe, Australasia and the Far East 
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publicized, and later, when the plans were signed into law. The indices chosen are generally 
regarded as bell-weathers for stock market performance in their respective regions. The data are 
also accurate, since they are publicly-available metrics of index performance and from reliable 
sources. 
I compared the performance of the indices in two ways: firstly, by converting the equity 
indices’ performance into a relative index, where the closing price on the eve of the key event is 
set as the baseline (i.e. index performance on the eve = 100). 20 September 2010 and 3 
December 2010 are the baselines for the September and December event windows, respectively.  
Figure 2: Large Cap Performance (September Event Window) 
 
Figure 3: Large Cap Performance (December Event Window)
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Figure 4: Small Cap Performance (September Event 
Window)
 
Figure 5: Small Cap Performance (December Event Window) 
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shorter duration of the second estimation period is due to the recent nature of the second event 
window. The results of the analysis are presented here: 
Table 2: Cumulative Return Differences for US and Foreign Equities Indices 
Panel A. S&P 500 versus S&P Euro 350 and MSCI EAFE 
 
S&P 500 Less S&P Euro 
350 
 
S&P 500 Less MSCI 
EAFE 
Event Window Sep 20-24 Dec 3-8 
 
Sep 20-24 Dec 3-8 
Differences in holding period 
returns (in percent) 
-1.73% 0.14% 
 
-0.98% 0.40% 
Bootstrapped standard error 
of the difference 
2.91% 1.25% 
 
1.02% 1.14% 
Historical standard error of 
the difference 
2.89% 1.28% 
 
1.03% 1.23% 
      
Panel B. Russell 2000 versus FTSE Small Cap and MSCI World Ex. US Small Cap 
 
Russell 2000 Less FTSE 
Small Cap 
 
Russell 2000 Less MSCI 
World Ex. US Small Cap 
Event Window Sep 20-24 Dec 3-8 
 
Sep 20-24 Dec 3-8 
Differences in holding period 
returns (in percent) 
-1.04% 0.08% 
 
-1.70% 0.91% 
Bootstrapped standard error 
of the difference 
2.16% 1.36% 
 
1.72% 1.66% 
Historical standard error of 
the difference 
2.10% 1.41% 
 
1.77% 1.74% 
 
The differences in holding period returns are in the expected direction, with the US 
indices underperforming their foreign counterparts during the September event window and 
outperforming them in the December event window. This is consistent with findings from the 
changes in dividend tax rates in 1993 (Ayers et al, 2002) and 2003 (Amronin et al, 2008).  
15 
 
That being said, even the most significant difference, between the Russell 2000 and 
MSCI Small Cap index for the September window, is still less than the estimated standard errors. 
However, this lack of significant abnormal returns at the aggregate level is not completely 
unexpected. One possible explanation is the theory of portfolio reallocation put forth in Amronin 
et al (2008), where they theorized that investors could have reallocated their investment 
portfolios from high- to low- dividend stocks in reaction to a potential rise in dividend taxes 
(such as the September event window), and vice versa when faced with a cut in dividend taxes 
(such as the December event window). I thus test this hypothesis by examining the cross-
sectional performance of US stocks during the event windows. 
Cross-Sectional Effects 
I accessed Compustat, Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat-
CRSP data via the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS), and 
filtered the data to select actively-traded US equities
12
. I then excluded Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (REITs), since REITs enjoy corporate tax breaks as long as they distribute a minimum of 
90% of their taxable income to investors
13
 (IRS, 2011). REITs would thus not be affected by 
either the termination or extension of the 2003 Bush tax cuts. This resulted in a sample of 3627 
firms. The data used is from fiscal year 2009. 
I then separated the firms into portfolios based on their 2009 dividend yield. Just under 
60% of the firms (2173 firms) were zero-dividend firms. Of the remaining 40%, the top quartile 
(363 firms) based on dividend yield were classified as ―High-dividend‖, the bottom quartile (363 
firms) ―Low-dividend‖ and the middle 50% (728 firms) ―Medium-dividend.‖ Select 
                                               
12 The CRSP dataset classifies stocks as either ―active‖ or ―inactive;‖ in choosing my dataset, I only checked the box 
for ―actively traded‖ 
13 IRS guidelines on REITs: http://www.irs.gov/instructions/i1120rei/ch01.html 
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characteristics of the firms in the various portfolios reflect that the high-dividend firms tend to be 
relatively small compared to the medium- and low- dividend firms. 
Table 3: Firm Characteristics by Dividend Portfolio 
Firm Characteristics by Dividend Yield Portfolio 
Portfolio 
Number 
of 
Firms 
Median Mean 
Dividend 
Yield 
Total 
Assets 
(Mil) 
LT 
Debt/ 
Assets 
PPE/ 
Assets 
Dividend 
Yield 
Total Assets 
(Mil) 
LT 
Debt/ 
Assets 
PPE/ 
Assets 
Zero-div 2173 0.00% 339.825 5.85% 11.61% 0.00% 6178.766318 15.85% 21.94% 
Low-div 363 0.76% 2358.894 11.28% 18.21% 2.79% 40327.89392 15.09% 25.57% 
Med-div 728 2.69% 2935.182 12.37% 12.98% 0.76% 24225.00214 16.17% 23.23% 
High-div 363 6.41% 1391.2015 16.00% 12.24% 8.15% 27145.7031 23.02% 28.86% 
 
I also calculated the estimated factor loadings of the portfolios using the March to August 
2010 estimation period. The factor loadings were calculated by regressing the portfolio returns 
on the single market factor (Rm - Rf), as well as the Fama-French factors, according to the 
following equations: 
ri = rf + β
MKT 
(rm - rf) + εi — (1a) 
ri = rf + β
MKT 
(rm - rf) +β
SMB 
(rS -rB) + β
HML
 (rH –rL) + εi — (2b) 
The Fama-French equation, equation (2), uses the following shorthand: 
 SMB: ―Small Minus Big;‖ measures the return differences of a portfolio of small-cap 
versus large cap stocks 
 HML: ―High Minus Low;‖ measure the return differences of a portfolio of stocks with 
high book-to-market ratios versus that with low book-to-market ratios 
Rm was taken to be the daily return of the S&P 500, and Rf  the rate which would give the one-
month T-bill rate when compounded for a month. The Fama-French factors were not available 
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for March 2011, so I did not calculate a similar regression to find the factor loadings for the latter 
estimation period. 
Table 4: Estimated Factor Loadings 
Estimated Factor Loadings, by Dividend Yield Portfolio 
Portfolio 
Number 
of Firms 
Equal-Weighted Portfolios 
Market 
βMKT 
Fama-French 
βMKT βSMB βHML 
Zero-div 2173 1.07 0.863 0.541 0.171 
Low-div 363 1.18 0.995 0.300 0.243 
Med-div 728 1.06 0.950 0.274 0.035 
High-div 363 0.84 0.732 0.190 0.127 
 
The estimated factor loadings are consistent with those found in Amronin et al (2008), 
with β being somewhat inversely related to the dividend yield of the portfolio. However, where 
Amronin et al’s factor loadings were all less than one, my factor loadings for all but the high-
dividend portfolio are greater than one. 
The next step I took was to calculate the cumulative return on each of the portfolios over 
the event windows. I used the estimated factor loadings from Table 4 to calculate cumulative 
abnormal returns, αi, according to the following equations: 
αi
M
 = (ri – rf) -   i
MKT
 (rm – rf )  — (2a) 
αi
FF
 = (ri – rf) -    i
MKT
 (rm – rf ) -   i
SMB 
(rS -rB) -   i
HML
 (rH –rL) — (2b) 
 
Item (3) in Table 5, the CAR Standard Error, was calculated by taking the standard deviation of 
the 3- or 4- trading-day
14
 CAR during the estimation period. 
 
                                               
14 3 trading days’ CAR to estimate the CAR S.E. for the December event window, and 4 trading days’ CAR for the 
September event window 
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Table 5: Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Dividend Portfolio—Single Factor Model 
Portfolio 
(1) 
Cumulative 
Return 
(2) 
CAR 
(3) 
CAR 
Standard 
Deviation 
Panel A. September Event Window (Sep. 20-24, 2010) 
Zero-div 0.86% 0.19% 1.03% 
Low-div 0.24% -0.49% 1.02% 
Medium-div 0.22% -0.45% 0.61% 
High-div 0.21% -0.35% 0.95% 
Panel B. December Event Window (Dec. 3-8, 2010) 
Zero-div 0.45% 0.13% 0.86% 
Low-div 0.32% -0.03% 0.83% 
Medium-div 0.46% 0.15% 0.52% 
High-div 0.28% 0.03% 0.78% 
 
Table 6: Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Dividend Portfolio—Fama-French 
Portfolio 
(1) 
Cumulative 
Return 
(2) 
CAR 
(3) 
CAR 
Standard 
Deviation 
Panel A. September Event Window (Sep. 20-24, 2010) 
Zero-div 0.86% -1.60% 2.87% 
Low-div 0.24% -2.30% 2.60% 
Medium-div 0.22% -2.10% 2.52% 
High-div 0.21% -1.61% 2.17% 
Panel B. December Event Window (Dec. 3-8, 2010) 
Zero-div 0.45% 0.45% 2.38% 
Low-div 0.32% 0.16% 2.22% 
Medium-div 0.46% 0.41% 2.10% 
High-div 0.28% 0.18% 1.82% 
 
 The results in the September event window are consistent with my hypothesis, with the 
dividend yield of the portfolio inversely relating to the strength of performance, and the CARs in 
both event windows being in the expected directions. This result is consistent with the initial 
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hypothesis that stocks with the highest dividend yields would be subject to the largest penalty if 
dividend taxes were to rise, and thus suffer the most during the September event window. These 
results, however, are not supported by the CARs. This could be due to the factor loadings for the 
high-dividend portfolio (Table 4) being less than one, while that of the other three portfolios was 
greater than one. 
The returns for the December event window are more puzzling than that of the September 
event window. Excluding the zero-dividend stocks, which did not perform as expected in the 
studies of the 2003 dividend tax cut, the high-dividend stocks still perform more poorly than 
expected. Instead of being the portfolio with the largest returns and CAR, the high-dividend 
portfolio has the lowest cumulative return and a CAR much lower than that of the medium-
dividend portfolio. This, however, could be due to the shorter duration of the dividend tax cuts in 
2010. In 2003, the lower dividend tax rates would have been effective for five years, while in 
2010, they were only extended for two years. In addition, investors might still have been wary of 
investing in smaller, high-risk, high-dividend firms in the wake of the 2007 financial crisis. 
The consistent strong performance of the zero-dividend portfolio is an unexpected result 
that was also observed across-the-board in studies of the initial implementation of the 2003 tax 
cuts. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to fully explain this result, this observation could 
reflect the underlying quality and high-growth potential of zero-dividend firms. After all, by not 
paying a dividend, such firms signal that all investment earnings have productive purposes 
through reinvestment. Particularly in a post-crisis period such as 2010, investors might seek to 
purchase equity stakes in such firms to ensure more sustained growth. In addition, the constancy 
of this observation in both 2003 and 2010 suggests that there are significant factors influencing 
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the performance of zero-dividend stocks that are still not well-understood and thus should be 
further researched. 
 Finally, none of the CAR results are statistically significant, and amongst these, the 
medium-dividend portfolio has the most significant results. This lack of statistically significant 
results is similar to that found by Amronin et al (2008), although their two significant CAR 
results were for the high-dividend portfolio, which thus provides stronger support for the 
hypothesis of portfolio reallocation. In the context of this study, however, significant CARs on 
the high-dividend portfolio are precluded by their unexpectedly poor performance, which, as 
mentioned above, could be due to the shorter duration of the dividend tax-cut and greater risk-
aversion amongst investors in a post-crisis environment. 
Conclusion 
 I investigate the effect of the possible expiration and eventual extension of the dividend 
tax cut on US stock market performance in 2010. I compare aggregate performance of US 
common stocks relative to foreign stocks using bell-weather equity indices, and examine cross-
sectional performance amongst US stocks by creating different stock portfolios based on their 
dividend yield. This comparison is done over two event windows, (1) 20-24 September 2010 and 
(2) 3-8 December 2010. 
Consistent with previous studies, I find that the US stock market did respond to negative 
and positive news on the extension of the Bush-era dividend tax cuts, with stock prices falling 
and rising, respectively. Although the aggregate level reaction was not statistically significant, 
this could be due to portfolio redistribution by investors. This theory of portfolio redistribution is 
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supported to a limited extent by cross-sectional performance, with the dividend yield being 
inversely related to cumulative returns in the September event window. 
These findings, however, are not always consistent with the CAR, and the CARs lack 
statistical significance. This suggests that more research should be done on these events, possibly 
further in the future from these event windows so as to ensure a more accurate estimation period 
that straddles both event windows. Such research would be highly relevant to the debate that will 
arise in 2012 when the dividend tax cuts are set to expire. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Snapshot of DJIA performance relative to S&P 500 performance over 
6-months (November 2010- April 2011) 
 
 
Source: Yahoo Finance 
 
DJI: Dow Jones Industrial Average 
GSPC: S&P 500 Index  
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